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Constitutional Law. State v. Roscoe, 198 A.3d 1232 (R.I. 2019).
The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated a conviction for murder
and first degree sexual assault, holding that out-of-court
testimonial statements of deceased declarants were introduced in
violation of the defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses,
which is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 10, of the Rhode Island
Constitution.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In August 1990, Germaine Mouchon (Mouchon), age eightyfive, was discovered dead and unclothed in her West Warwick
apartment. 1 Detective Dennis Bousquet (Bousquet) of the West
Warwick Police Department determined that there was no forced
entry, and that the apartment was in “relative order,” except for an
overturned end table and a woman’s slip lying on the floor. 2 Upon
reporting to the scene, medical examiner Francis Garrity, M.D.
(Garrity) pronounced Mouchon deceased and performed a “cursory
. . . examination of her body.” 3 Later, at the medical examiner’s
facility, Garrity identified injuries to Mouchon’s head and face.4 At
that point, he swabbed Mouchon’s body for DNA. 5 The swabs were
preserved in a sealed evidence collection kit.6 During the autopsy,
Garrity identified “indicators of a failing cardiovascular system,”
leading him to declare the cause of death to be a “heart attack or a
cardiac arrest following a traumatic event[,] namely multiple blunt
force injuries about the face, left breast.” 7 Initially, Garrity was

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

State v. Roscoe, 198 A.3d 1232, 1235 (R.I. 2019).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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unable to determine the manner of death. 8 However, after learning
that Mouchon’s swabs had tested positive for sperm, and further
learning from Bousquet that Mouchon was not involved in a
romantic relationship, Garrity found homicide to be the manner of
death. 9
The case went cold for some twenty-five years, at which time
Mouchon’s swabs were retested.10 The resulting DNA profile
matched one David Roscoe, who was indicted on December 16, 2015
for murder and first degree sexual assault, in violation of Rhode
Island General Laws sections 11-23-1 and 11-37-2, respectively.11
He was convicted by a jury on both counts and, after the trial justice
denied his motion for new trial, he received two concurrent life
sentences. 12
Subsequently, Roscoe appealed his conviction to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court (the Court), arguing that the trial justice
erred by:
(1) failing to order a mistrial after the prosecutor made
improper remarks to the jury during his closing argument;
(2) allowing the medical examiner’s manner of death to be
presented to the jury; and (3) allowing statements of
deceased declarants to be admitted into evidence, in
violation of the Confrontation Clause of the United States
and the Rhode Island Constitutions. 13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
A. Prosecutor’s Remarks
The Court began by examining the prosecutor’s supposedly
“inappropriate, pungent, vulgar, and inaccurate remarks during

8. Id. at 1235–36.
9. Id. at 1236.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. Roscoe also suggested that his convictions were violative of the
prohibition against double jeopardy, but the Court never considered this
avenue of attack. Id.
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the course of his closing argument,” 14 reviewing for clear error on
the part of the trial justice. 15
Roscoe took issue with three comments in particular, which the
Court considered in turn. 16 First, the prosecutor had mentioned
the rules of hearsay: specifically, he had stated that there were
things he “couldn’t say” to the jury. 17 Roscoe averred that this
statement insinuated the existence of “incriminating or sinister
facts,” thereby inducing “wild speculation by the jury.” 18 The Court
dismissed this contention, noting that the statements were not
explicit summons to conjecture.19 Rather, the remarks were made
clumsily during an attempt to elucidate sophisticated DNA
science.20 The prosecutor’s language may have been artless, the
Court admitted, but it discerned no clear error in the trial justice’s
ruling that the utterances fell short of sowing prejudice in the
jurors’ minds. 21
Second, Roscoe argued that the prosecutor had misled the jury
by falsely attributing words to Garrity, the medical examiner. 22 On
redirect, the prosecutor had posed a hypothetical to Garrity as to
how an individual with heart trouble might react to a violent attack
on her person. 23 Garrity had answered that such an individual’s
life would be at risk; that she might “suffer[] a cardiac arrest as a
result of the stress, the panic, and the pain.” 24 However, in his
closing, the prosecutor neglected the hypothetical context of
Garrity’s answer, asserting that the medical examiner had stated
that “the pain, the panic, the anxiety of the sexual assault pushed
this woman over the edge.” 25 However, the Court concluded that
the trial justice was correct in determining that the prosecutor’s
statement did not constitute “blatant misrepresentation,” but
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
1974)).
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id. at 1237 (quoting State v. Dubois, 36 A.3d 191, 197 (R.I. 2012)).
See id. at 1237–40.
Id. at 1236.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Bolden, 323 A.2d 797, 799 (Pa. Super.
See id. at 1238.
Id. at 1237–38.
See id. at 1238.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
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rather “a fair inference” from Garrity’s testimony. 26 The Court also
noted that the trial justice had provided adequate “cautionary
instruction” concerning the non-evidentiary nature of the
prosecutor’s words. 27
Third, Roscoe objected to the prosecutor’s accusation that the
defense had labeled Mouchon a “slut” and “whore.”28 Roscoe
maintained that his counsel had said no such thing, but had merely
suggested that it was not beyond the realm of possibility that the
victim and defendant enjoyed voluntary intercourse, despite their
great age difference. 29 The Court condemned the prosecutor’s
“coarse and vulgar verbiage” as “unacceptable,” and affirmed that
his remarks were “untethered to the record.” 30 Yet the Court also
acknowledged that it had previously held that such inappropriate
remarks are not always grounds for vacating a conviction, finding
that they sometimes amount to little more than “harmless error . . .
in the face of ‘overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt’ and
adequate cautionary instructions.” 31
Ultimately, the Court
refrained from deciding whether the comments were so egregious
as to necessitate that Roscoe’s conviction be vacated, since it
reached the same conclusion on different grounds. 32
B. Medical Examiner’s Testimony
The Court next considered Roscoe’s argument that Garrity’s
testimony concerning the manner of Mouchon’s death had been
wrongly admitted into evidence. Specifically, Roscoe asserted that
the testimony of a medical examiner should not rely on “anecdotal
history and the results of the police investigation.” 33 In essence,
Roscoe argued that Garrity’s pronouncement of homicide hinged on
his knowledge that sperm had been found in Mouchon’s body,
combined with witness statements that she had not been engaged
in a romantic relationship. 34 In other words, Garrity, though
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1239.
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1239–40.
31. Id. at 1240 (quoting State v. Simpson, 658 A.2d 522, 528 (R.I. 1995)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 1241.
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offered as a medical expert, testified based on facts extraneous to
his technical and scientific expertise. 35
However, the Court concluded for two reasons that the trial
justice had not erred: first, it was understandable for the medical
examiner to account for the decedent’s personal history; second,
Garrity had not relied “solely or primarily” on witness testimony. 36
Drawing on the jurisprudence of other states,37 the Court declared
that it is permissible for medical examiners to “supplement their
medical findings with other information . . . so long as they do not
rely solely or primarily on such information.” 38
C. Violations of the Confrontation Clause
Finally, the Court took up Roscoe’s claim that his right to
confront adverse witnesses had been violated by Bousquet’s
testimony that he had asked Mouchon’s friends and family about
her romantic status, which testimony was also referenced by the
prosecutor in closing.39 The right to confront adverse witnesses is
enshrined in the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 10, of the Rhode Island
Constitution.40 Because of the constitutional character of this
claim, the Court reviewed the trial justice’s ruling de novo. 41
Additionally, the Court applied harmless-error analysis.42
The Court noted that sexual intercourse had very likely
occurred between Roscoe and Mouchon, considering that the
35. See id. at 1240–41.
36. Id. at 1241.
37. In particular, the Court leaned on South Carolina v. Commander, 721
S.E.2d 413 (S.C. 2011).
38. Roscoe, 198 A.3d at 1243. The Court thus distinguished Roscoe from
State v. Castore, 435 A.2d 321 (R.I. 1981), where a physician made a
determination of child abuse based solely on anecdotal history as related by the
patient-complainant. See id. at 1241-42.
39. Id. at 1244–45. The witnesses had died in the intervening years. Id.
at 1245. As for Bousquet, he was retired when the trial took place. Id. at 1244,
n.8.
40. Id. at 1244.
41. Id. (quoting State v. Moten, 64 A.3d 1232, 1238 (R.I. 2013)).
42. Id. at 1245 (citing State v. Albanese, 970 A.2d 1215, 1222 (R.I. 2009)).
In essence, the Court asked: even if “the damaging potential of . . . crossexamination were fully realized,” was the error still “harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt?” Id. (quoting Albanese, 970 A.2d at 1222).
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former’s sperm was recovered from the latter’s person. 43 The major
question was whether this intercourse had been consensual. 44 On
direct, Bousquet testified that he had asked three individuals close
to Mouchon about her relationship status, although the detective
did not relay these individuals’ responses. 45 In his closing
argument, the prosecutor referenced Bousquet’s testimony, adding:
“Don’t you think [the police] would have followed up?”46
The Court concluded that the statements of the three
unavailable witnesses offered by way of Bousquet were
“testimonial,” that is, they were meant to “establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” 47
Although Bousquet did not expressly convey the words of the three
witnesses, “the jury was left with the unavoidable implication that
each of these individuals had told the police they did not believe
Mrs. Mouchon was in a relationship.” 48 This impression was
“reinforced” in the prosecutor’s closing argument. 49
The
Confrontation Clause pertains where, as here, the jury can surmise
the “contents of untested out-of-court testimonial statements.”50
The State argued in response that, even if the jury gleaned the
contents of the unavailable witnesses’s statements from Bousquet’s
testimony, Roscoe was not “directly implicate[d]” thereby. 51 After
all, even if the jury gathered that Mouchon was not in a relationship
with Roscoe, there was no need to conclude on that basis that
Roscoe sexually assaulted Mouchon.52
The Court was not
convinced, noting that the statements of the unavailable witnesses
were offered to prove Roscoe’s guilt.53 Therefore, the Court found
that the trial justice erred, insofar as he effectively admitted, via

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1246 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006))
(internal quotations omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing United States v. Meises, 645 F.3d 5, 21 (1st Cir. 2011);
United States v. Kizee, 877 F.3d 650, 657 (5th Cir. 1972)).
51. Id. at 1247.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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Bousquet’s testimony, the testimony of the three unavailable
witnesses, whom the defendant was unable to confront.54
Lastly, the Court determined that the trial justice’s error was
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 55 Given the State’s
burden to prove the nonconsensual nature of the sexual contact
between Mouchon and Roscoe—and given the absence of defensive
hand wounds, vaginal injuries, and signs of forced entry—much
hinged on whether a romantic relationship existed between victim
and defendant.56 Since evidence of that relationship turned on the
testimonial statements of the unavailable witnesses, the Court
could not conclude that, had the witnesses between cross-examined,
no reasonable jury would have acquitted.57
D. Holding and Concurrences
The Court held that the “introduction of out-of-court
statements of deceased declarants” violated Roscoe’s right to
confront adverse witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and article I, section 10, of the Rhode
Island Constitution. 58 Thus, the Court vacated his conviction and
ordered a new trial. 59
Chief Justice Suttell concurred, adding that the trial justice
abused his discretion by failing to grant a mistrial because of the
prosecutor’s accusation that the defense had called Mouchon a
“slut” and “whore.” 60 Such remarks were not only “inflammatory,”
but also “false.” 61 Justice Robinson also concurred, reckoning that
reversal could be granted based on the “very inappropriate
language and baseless animadversions in the prosecutor’s closing
argument.” 62

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. (quoting State v. Albanese, 970 A.2d 1215, 1222 (R.I. 2009)).
Id. at 1248.
Id.
Id. (Suttell, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. (Robinson, J., concurrng).
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COMMENTARY
The Court’s opinion is persuasive on all points save the
prosecutor’s hearsay remarks. The Court acknowledged that
hearsay references are egregious because they suggest ominous and
incriminatory facts, thereby tempting jurors’ imaginations to run
amok. 63 However, in the instant case, the Court excused such
insinuations, finding their danger mitigated by their context.64 Yet
poison is poison whether drunk from chalice or mug. The
prosecutor intimated hidden evidence; he thereby invited
conjecture. Although “the ruling of the trial justice . . . [should] not
be disturbed on appeal unless clearly wrong,”65 the trial justice here
admitted that the “‘[c]ourt’s ears went up’ at the mention of
hearsay.” 66 Arguably, this reflex indicated recognition of a serious
transgression by the prosecutor. Given the prosecutor’s other
blameworthy behavior, the Court could reasonably have
interpreted his hearsay allusions as calculated encouragements to
the jury to traffic in fantasy rather than fact. The Court’s ruling on
this matter may ultimately be correct. However, at very least, its
analysis evinces a surprising insensitivity to the peril to justice
occasioned by the prosecutor’s remarks. It is axiomatic that a
defendant in a criminal case should have fair opportunity to
confront evidence offered against him. Allusions to unseen,
unspecified evidence make mockery of due process by raising the
specter of damning facts that the defendant cannot firmly grasp
and squarely challenge.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the prosecutor’s use
of out-of-court testimonial statements of deceased declarants
violated the defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses, as
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 10, of the Rhode Island
Constitution.
The Court therefore vacated the defendant’s

63.
64.
65.
66.

See id. at 1237 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1238.
Id. (citing State v. Dubois, 36 A.3d 191, 197 (R.I. 2012)).
Id.
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conviction for murder and first degree sexual assault and ordered a
new trial.
Philip Primeau

